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1. Introduction
“Optimising the Use of Cultural Heritage” is a title that may provoke misunderstand-
ings. It is therefore worthwhile to start by indicating what will not be addressed in
the paper. This paper will not give an in-depth analysis of the costs and beneﬁts that
arise from inherited works of art and architecture, from the preservation of knowledge
about a society and its history for future generations, or from a set of shared norms
and ideals that are essential for the working of a community. Neither will it tackle the
problem of how these costs and beneﬁts can be measured1, nor how strategic incentives
to misrepresent individual valuation can be overcome.2
Rather it will try to analyse how the institutional arrangements under which speciﬁc
parts of the cultural heritage are made available to potential users aﬀect the welfare
created by the use of these items. The analysis presented below will, therefore, take as
∗Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Department of Economics, Universit¨ at des Saarlandes,
Germany. I am indebted to Joshua Bauroth, Michael Hutter, Lea Paterson, Dieter Schmidtchen,
Roland Schr¨ oder and Michele Trimarchi for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1See, for example, Bille Hansen (1995) or the paper presented at this conference by Frey (1995).
2For the importance of these strategic incentives to misrepresent individual valuations for public goods
see, for example, Throsby and Withers (1986).
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given the notion of speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts that result from the use of the cultural
heritage and will try to assess which form of use will maximise the diﬀerence between
beneﬁts and costs.
In order to achieve this goal, we will ﬁrst attempt to give a working deﬁnition of “cultural
heritage” for the purpose of the subsequent analysis (section 2.1). Furthermore, a brief
discussion of the potential beneﬁts and costs is necessary (section 2.2). The main part
of this paper, however, will focus on a simple model in order to show how the welfare
that can be derived from the use of things belonging to the cultural heritage depends
on the institutional arrangements that govern this use (section 3). This analysis allows
us to draw some implications for the optimal use of cultural heritage (section 4).
Of course, the focus chosen in this paper does not imply that the problems analysed
are the most important ones which need to be solved for optimising the use of cultural
heritage. It may even seem that the treatment of the subject is likely to deprive cultural
heritage of all its distinctive features. One should keep in mind, however, that a thor-
ough understanding of the basic determinants of aggregate welfare can be regarded as
a useful if not necessary contribution to any sensible policy recommendation. The way
in which diﬀerent forms of provision aﬀect aggregate welfare can serve as a guideline for
(empirical) research into the speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts associated with speciﬁc forms of
cultural heritage. Decisions about the preservation of cultural heritage ultimately have
to be made on the basis of information about value that can and will be drawn from
the preserved objects. In order to avoid decisions that are likely to decrease welfare, it
is crucial to recognise the way in which the speciﬁc institutional arrangements chosen
aﬀect the value that will be realised. In this sense, the simple analysis presented in this
paper will hopefully complement the work that has been done and has to be done in
this ﬁeld.
2. An Economic View of Cultural Heritage
2.1 Cultural Heritage: A Working Deﬁnition
Unfortunately, a clear cut deﬁnition of cultural heritage that could be used for economic
analysis does not exist. The review of “Cost Beneﬁt Analysis for the Cultural Built
Heritage” (ICOMOS, 1993) starts from the assertion that “each generation ﬁnds itself
with a huge amount of capital resources, to which each individual has access simply
through being born into the human race. The capital is broadly made up of three kinds:
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a) natural resources (God or Nature given)
b) man-made resources ... comprising broadly the immoveables (the built environ-
ment) and moveables (the furnitures, cars etc) ...
c) human resources, being the people inhabiting and multiplying on the planet,”
where the cultural built heritage can be deﬁned as the “part of the built environment
which the contemporary generation resolves has ‘cultural values’, and accordingly merits
special protection.”3 Vaughan (1984, p. 1) starts his analysis of income and employment
eﬀects of cultural heritage by stating that “[t]he cultural heritage of a nation consists
of three parts: the artistic, the natural and the historical. ... [O]ver recent years ... an
increasingly important part of the debate has focused attention of the economic impact
of the heritage.”
If in most cases we can talk about “cultural heritage” without ever giving a clear deﬁ-
nition of the term, this may exactly be due to the fact that we share the same cultural
heritage. But even if this common understanding allows us to use terms without giv-
ing them an exact deﬁnition, the term “cultural heritage” can be used in such a broad
sense that any attempt to derive a set of conditions for “optimal use” of everything that
might be included under this term must seem ridiculous. We have to look for a working
deﬁnition of cultural heritage for the purpose of this paper, i.e. for a deﬁnition suitable
to address the question of optimal use.
Let us start with a broad deﬁnition of cultural heritage. It comprises things like works
of art and architecture, cultural achievements as well as ideas, norms and a common
understanding of the environment that have been passed on from earlier generations. A
common characteristic of all objects that fall under this deﬁnition is that they need not
to be produced by the current generation, but are inherited from previous generations.
These items can roughly be divided between tangible assets (such as works of art and
architecture) and intangible assets (such as a common identity, social and moral norms
that are rooted in a shared culture, and so on). This latter part, important as it may be
3At least with regard to the man-made resources (and also with regard to some natural resources),
the “access through simply being born into the human race”, of course, seems to be an instance of
wishful thinking, as anyone can prove who has ever tried to enter, for example, the Colosseo or the
Palazzo Pitti only by virtue of being a member of the human race.
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for the functioning of any ordered society, shall not be part of our subsequent analysis.4
Rather, we will concentrate on the tangible assets that are passed on from previous
generations, such as works of art, architecture, man-made modiﬁcations of the natural
environment, and so on. These tangible assets are capital resources in the sense of the
ICOMOS deﬁnition. The stock of resources inherited from past generations creates a
ﬂow of beneﬁts (a rate of return), and will depreciate if not maintained.
To diﬀerentiate cultural heritage from the broader class of inherited objects, another
criterion must be met: the tangible objects under consideration must be valued not only
with regard to the potential use for which they were originally produced, but for their
connection to the cultural development of a society. These objects are valued for their
status as the manifestation of the cultural development of the past.5
This eﬀect is reﬂected in the valuation of cultural heritage. It is not only due to its
aesthetic qualities or its usefulnesse for the purposes of daily life (e.g. the value of a
rennaissance palazzo as a dwelling for contemporary tenants) that the legacy of past
generations is of interest to contemporaries, but it also results from its orle as the visible
and tangible part of the ideas and norms that formed the evolution of our society.
To summarise: we will use the term “cultural heritage” in the subsequent analysis for a
collection of tangible objects related to the cultural development of a society that are
inherited from past generations and are valued by contemporaries not only for their aes-
thetic values or for their usefulness, but also as an expression of the cultural development
of a society.
This stock of tangible assets can be used in two principal ways.6 On the one hand, the
use can focus on the immediate functional aspects of the objects. This is to say that,
for example, a renaissance palazzo can be used as a dwelling (or, more probably, as an
4Of course, this does not imply that the analysis of norms and rules as well as their cultural origin
are not amenable to economic analysis. On the contrary, the importance of those norms and values
and their eﬀects on the co-operation and co-ordination within a society have been a central part of
much of the recent development in the ‘New Institutional Economics’. Among many others see, for
example, the works of Douglass North (notably his “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance”, (North, 1990) or Robert Sugden (e.g. Sugden (1986).
5In this respect, the tangible part of the cultural heritage is closely connected to the intangible part (i.e.
ideas, norms and, more generally, the intellectual development of a society), because its production
has been aﬀected by these ideas and, therefore, it can be regarded as an expression or representation
of the cultural identity of a society in a particular period. For example, renaissance architecture is
strongly connected to the ideals of humanism and to European society’s reminiscence of its ancient
origins (see, for example, the excellent study by Wittkower [1983]).
6Notwithstanding this principal distinction, both forms of use may not be easily distinguishable and
can overlap.
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oﬃce building or a conference centre). On the other hand, the objects can be used in
a way that builds upon their special characteristics as part of the cultural heritage. In
this case, the palazzo would have to be made available to the general public in the form
of, for example, a museum.
To distinguish cultural heritage from other inherited objects, we will assume that for
elements of cultural heritage the the value that is attributed to the second form of use
exceeds the value that is attributed to the ﬁrst form of use.
2.2 The Beneﬁts and Costs from the Use of Cultural Heritage
2.2.1 Direct and External Beneﬁts
The most obvious beneﬁt from the use of cultural heritage is determined by the value
that “consumers” of cultural heritage put onto the “product” (or, more exactly, the
stream of services that ﬂow from the use of this stock of cultural heritage). In this sense,
the beneﬁts from use are expressed in the individual users’ willingness to pay for these
goods or services.7
As for works of art more generally, one might argue that there exist external beneﬁts
from the use of cultural heritage that are not fully reﬂected in the individual users’
valuation. In looking for these beneﬁts, a promising place to start is the collection of
arguments brought forward to justify public support for the arts. These arguments may
point to possible beneﬁts from the existence and use of cultural heritage that go beyond
the immediate value put onto the stock of cultural heritage by its “users” in the proper
sense.8
Following Duﬀy (1992), who examines these arguments with regard to public funding
of national museums, there are several strands along which one can try to argue for
additional beneﬁts from the existence or use of works of art. Let us brieﬂy consider
them in turn:
7For the sake of simplicity, the analysis in this paper will be conducted in terms of discounted streams of
returns and (re-)investments. Of course, this present value approach ignores the timing of investment
decisions and the eﬀects from discounting, but allows for a clearer exposition of the basic problems.
8 Any consideration of these arguments, however, has to take into account that they are used in
many (if not most cases) to justify public funding and are, thus, more often than not an instance of
rent-seeking behaviour (see, for example Peacock (1992), or Lingle (1992)).
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a) Option Demand and Existence Value
By option demand, it is meant that individuals beneﬁt from the availability of (preserved
and accessible) cultural heritage, even though they do not actually use these facilities.
As Duﬀy (1992, p. 38) observes, the “existence of option demand is a possible area
of market failure since under the market system those who do not consume goods or
services are not, in general, in a position to express their preferences through payment”.
Of course, this is a fairly general situation that can be found in all markets where the
amount exchanged at a given price is below market satiation. All people who are not
willing to buy widgets at their current price may nevertheless put a value onto widgets.
The only signal that is transmitted in the marketplace is that their valuation of widgets
is less than the price.9
Therefore, option demand may more properly be deﬁned as the feature that individuals
like being able to satisfy their demand in case they will possibly demand these goods or
services in the future. This is to say, that individuals put a value onto the availability
of speciﬁc goods or services even at present they would not consume these goods and
services at the given price.10
b) Merit Goods/Information Deﬁciency:
The merit good argument essentially states that works of art, or a stock of cultural
heritage for that matter, are intrinsically valuable. The merit value of a good or a
service, thus, is by deﬁnition independent from the valuation by actual as well as possible
users.11 The basic problem with this merit good argument is that it is incompatible with
the methodological framework of economics. Neither the principle of methodological
individualism nor the commonly accepted principle of subjectivism will allow for such
thing as a merit good or a merit want.12 Economists usually tend to take as given
individual preferences, even if they are not stable but subject to endogeneous changes.
These preferences are not to be evaluated from the position of an outside observer. By
9In the same way, people who buy widgets do not express their valuation, but only signal that this
valuation widgets is above the market price.
10Thus, option demand can be seen as a kind of insurance demand, which is a problem only in cases
where a free rider problem exists. If individuals know that a speciﬁc supply will be maintained only
if they contribute to the current cost of providing the good or service, then the problem vanishes.
Furthermore, option demand is expressed in a willingness to pay - basically not for the product
or the service, but for the option to buy the product or service in the future (for a more detailed
description of option demand or option value see e.g. Nijkamp (1991, p. 8 f).
11See Musgrave (1959) or Priddat (1992).
12See e.g. Culyer (1971, 1973) or, for a discussion of the methodological problems, Erlei (1992) and
Koboldt (1995, p. 151 ﬀ.)
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methodological individualism, all value judgments must be grounded on the individual
preferences - there is no interest of a society or a collective that is independent or
underivable from the interests of the individual members. Consumers may or may not
be ignorant and uncertain about their own welfare. But the ultimate test of this assertion
remains in the realm of the impossible, and all arguments that are not based on individual
valuations must be rejected.13
c) Production Externalities - Tourism/Employment/Regional Development:
Positive externalities and spillovers from the availability of cultural experiences are often
maintained as reasons that justify public support. Thus, one has to examine the extent
to which beneﬁts from the use of cultural heritage arise from such positive spillovers.
With regard to tourism and employment, of course, only the incremental eﬀect that
results from the use of cultural heritage must be taken into account. This is to say that
the positive eﬀects of the availability of a historic site on tourism, for example, must be
assessed on the comparison with a situation that is identical but for the availability of
this historic site. Basically, it is only the additional income (as compared to income from
other uses of the resources devoted to tourism) due to the additional inﬂow of tourists
resulting from the potential visit to a historic site that can truly be regarde as a positive
eﬀect of the use of this speciﬁc form of cultural heritage. Apparently, the positive eﬀects
of cultural heritage are easily overestimated.
d) Consumption Externalities - National Identity/Education/Research/Future
Generations:
Allegedly, the arts in general, show consumption externalities such as the development
of a national identity, beneﬁts from education and research, or the preservation of knowl-
edge about a society for future generations.
With regard to these externalities, one has to distinguish very carefully between eﬀects
that depend on the use or the pure existence of cultural heritage. Consider, for example,
the development of national identity. If national identity - which is without any further
discussion assumed to be valuable - ﬂows from the pure existence of artistic production
or the preservation of the cultural heritage, then the beneﬁts from cultural heritage are
13Of course, common sense may tell us that in many cases individuals are very likely to be uncertain or
even ignorant about their own welfare. A parsimonious statement and, more so, a policy prescription
require stronger foundations than the simple impression that other people who are usually regarded
as autonomous individuals who are responsible for themselves (i.e. grown ups who can care for their
own) do not know what is really good for them. This is particularly true if this judgment is based on
the fact that people do not want to pay for a good or service which the (potential) suppliers think
they should buy.
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realised even if no indidvidual would ever “use” this heritage in the sense of deriving
direct beneﬁts. If, on the other hand, the formation of national identity depends on
the experience of actually using the stock of cultural heritage, then the intensity of use
becomes important.
Furthermore, some of these externalities may not be unique to cultural heritage, and
could be used to argue for universal interventionism, so that one has to be very careful
about where to draw the line. For example, positive externalities from education are
more general and not conﬁned to the ﬁeld of culture or art.14 Moreover, it is not only
education that may improve the quality of citizenship. The argument could easily be
extended. If well educated people tend to be better citizens, so do people who are well
fed and well clothed. The argument basically supports a minimum standard of living
that must be provided if society does not want to fall back into anarchy.
Finally, in many cases the future-generation argument considers only a positive value
that future generations are expected to put onto the inherited objects from the past, and
often neglects the possibility that future generations may see the legacy as a burden. In
any case, the future-generation argument has to be supported by a careful analysis of the
extent to which future generations beneﬁt from having a wider range of choices resulting
from the bequest of cultural heritage. Clearly, there is a diﬀerence between assets that
would be lost forever without eﬀorts to preserve them for future generations, assets that
would be preserved even without conscious eﬀorts to preservation, and assets that can
be recreated by future generations if they so wish (see Peacock (1992, p. 12)).15
2.2.2 Beneﬁts and Use
Looking at all the arguments that try to identify the beneﬁts that can be derived from
cultural heritage, it seems to be the case that
14For example, Clawson and Knetsch (1966, p. 267) attribute this eﬀect also to outdoor recreation: “It
is widely argued ... that outdoor recreation is essential to a full and well-balanced personal life; that
those who participate in outdoor recreation tend to become better adjusted socially and better and
more productive citizens; and thus the welfare of the whole nation is enhanced. According to this
argument, everyone beneﬁts in some way, and even those who do not partake of outdoor recreation
have an interest in its ready availability, and should be willing to pay for it.”
15The tradition of Shakesperean plays performed in the settings of an Elizabethean stage seems to be
one example in case. The reconstruction of the soon to be opened Globe theatre in Southwark, the
original theatre having been destroyed in the 17th century, is an attempt to bring back to live also
the original theatrical experience.
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• many if not most of the beneﬁts are realised only in the course of actual use.
Therefore, the number of people who can and do use the cultural heritage is of
paramount importance. Even if some external beneﬁts accrue to persons who will
not use the cultural heritage themselves, they may not be independent from the
level of use. For example, the educational eﬀects of cultural heritage may not be
realised simply by cultural heritage being around, but may require those who are
to be educated to actually use this stock of heritage, although others beneﬁt from
this use;
• There may be a second category of external eﬀects resulting from the existence
of cultural heritage. These beneﬁts are “public” in the sense that they can be
realised in a nonrivalrous way, i.e. the beneﬁts experienced by one individual do
not diminish the beneﬁts that can be experienced by other individuals. Addition-
ally, there may be nonexcludability, leading to free riding, as in the case of the
development of national identity and prestige. These beneﬁts arise mainly from
the fact that tangible objects of the cultural heritage are a necessary precondition
for the existence of the intangible part of the cultural heritage. In a sense, they
may be regarded as the crystalisation point for norms and ideas that are rooted in
a common cultural tradition.16
In any case, the external beneﬁts commonly alleged to the existence and use of cultural
heritage have to be analysed very carefully and suspiciously, as the arguments more often
than not are intended to justify public funding and are, therefore, results of rent-seeking
behaviour rather than of serious analysis.17
2.2.3 The costs of using cultural heritage
In contrast to the possible beneﬁts from using the cultural heritage, the costs can be
deﬁned more easily: in economic terms, it is the opportunity cost that must be at-
tributed to the preservation and the use of those objects that are conceived of as the
cultural heritage. This opportunity cost clearly does not comprise only outlays (eg for
the preservation of an historic site). When determining opportunity cost, one has also
16Thus, cultural heritage may show characteristic features similar to the output of the performing arts
which “can be characterized as a mixed good with joint production of a private component enjoyed
by the individual attendees and a public-good component deriving from the value of the arts and
culture to society at a large.” (Throsby, 1994, p. 9)
17For example, Globerman (1989, p. 17) explicitly states that “[e]conomic models of rent-seeking be-
haviour ... suggest that we should adopt a much more cautious attitude towards invocations of the
externalities argument.” See also footnote 8.
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to take into account beneﬁts foregone from alternative uses of the territory covered by
the historic site (cf. Tiepelmann (1992, p. 266 ﬀ)). The opportunity cost of preserving
Ercolaneo must comprise the price or the rent for the area if it had to be bought or rented
from somebody whose next best alternative would be to build a large supermarket or
tennis courts. The beneﬁts from alternative uses foregone must be incorporated in the
opportunity cost of using the site in the way it is used.
Of course, it may be extremely diﬃcult to measure the costs associated with the preser-
vation (or existence) and use of cultural heritage. With regard to the planning of conser-
vation projects, for example, Nijkamp (1991, p. 18) states: “An inherent problem in the
measurement of costs is whether they can be separated from other costs and hence can
be unambiguously attributed to the project. Infrastructure investments necessary for a
new project or plan generate costs which cannot exclusively be attributed to a single
use, as they have normally a multi-purpose character”.
Nevertheless, “the powerful and simple concept of opportunity cost is the economists’
greatest gift to policy analysis. If we cannot precisely measure the opportunity costs of
diﬀerent policies, the concept is no less relevant” (Globerman, 1989, p. 17).
3. Using Cultural Heritage: A Simple Model
In this section, we will consider the “optimal use” of cultural heritage under diﬀerent
scenarios within the framework of a simple model. We will take as given the existence
of preferences for the use of cultural heritage, and costs of this use. For the sake of
simplicity, we will abstract from external beneﬁts, assuming that most (if not all) of the
beneﬁts are realised by the users.18
Let us consider a speciﬁc form of cultural heritage, say a historic site, that can be made
available to visitors. Let us assume that there are n potential visitors to the site. For
the sake of simplicity, we will assume homogeneous individuals with identical tastes.
3.1 The basic model: maximising welfare
As a reference for the analysis of diﬀerent scenarios, we will ﬁrst deﬁne the welfare-
maximising use of cultural heritage. This is to say that we look at a situation where
the sum of consumer and “producer” surplus is maximised without any reference to the
allocation mechanism that could bring about this situation.
18We will, however, consider external beneﬁts in the implications drawn in the concluding section.
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First, we have to model the beneﬁts and costs that result from the use of the historic
site. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the number of visits and the quality
of the site will remain constant over time, so that we can avoid looking at the temporal
dimension by explicitly examining the discounted streams of costs and beneﬁts that arise
over the “lifespan” of the site (which may, of course, be inﬁnite).
The average valuation19 put onto one visit to the site by any individual visitor will
be denoted by v(q,x), where q stands for the “quality” of the site, e.g. the way it is
presented to the visitor, the eﬀort made by the providers to guide visitors through the
site, etc, and where x denotes the number of visits made by this individual visitor. The
average valuation per visit is assumed to increase with the quality of the site (vq > 0),
and to decrease with the number of visits (vx < 0). Additionally, we will assume that
the decrease in the average value per visit is stronger with an increase in the number of
visits x, i.e. vxx < 0.20
Let us assume that making the site available to visitors and maintaining a speciﬁc level
of quality costs m(q) with mq > 0 and mqq ≥ 0. We assume that this cost is independent
of the number of visitors. Of course, the cost for cleaning up the site or the (expected)
cost of replacing broken items may increase with the number of visitors. But at least
within a certain range, an additional visitor can “consume” the quality of the site without
19We will cast the analysis in terms of average valuation and average costs rather than total value and
total costs for the sake of expositional convenience.
20This assumption is consistent with the usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility, given stable
preferences. Of course, one might argue that the “consumption” of cultural heritage has an educa-
tional eﬀect, and thus, preferences may change with the number of visits to a historic site. Thus,
consuming cultural heritage may give rise to endogenous changes of taste. For the purpose of this
paper we will abstract from this possibility, noting that the same eﬀects that can result from endoge-
neous changes of taste can be modelled as changes in the “consumption” technology, i.e. as changes
in the relative prices of diﬀerent commodities. For this approach see Stigler and Becker (1977) or
Becker and Murphy (1988). Even if this approach may entail the same problems as an approach that
allows for changes in the preferences of individuals (cf. Yaari (1977)), it does avoid the diﬃculties
with assessing alternative allocations with reference to the individuals’ preferences (for a discussion
see Koboldt (1995, p. 47 ﬀ)).
As Throsby (1994, p. 3) notes, “ [r]egardless of the theoretical underpinning, ... the endogenization
of tastes is likely to be essential if any progress is to be made in explaining demand for the arts.”
(emphasis added). While this endogenisation may be necessary to explain the rightward shifting of
the (long run) demand curve, it does not change the fact that there is a demand curve that shows
the usual characteristics, i.e. that is downward sloping.
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increasing the cost of maintaining this quality.21
The cost of providing the site at a quality q can be assumed to vary with the speciﬁc
features of a site. It may be much more expensive to make archeological excavations
available to visitors than providing visits to, for example, a medieval castle.
Furthermore, let c(X,q) denote the average cost per visit, depending on the total number
of visits X with X = nx, and on the quality of the site.22 In addition to cq > 0,
cqq ≥ 0 and cX ≥ 0, we will assume that the business of serving visitors does not exhibit
increasing returns to scale, such that cXX ≥ 0.
To visit the site, visitors may have to incur a cost independently of a possible admis-
sion fee, e.g. for travel, accomodation etc. (cf. Clawson and Knetsch (1966, p. 43 ﬀ.)).
This cost, of course, is earned income for travel agents, transportation ﬁrms, hotels and
catering businesses. If all these sectors (and the rest of the economy) are perfectly com-
petitive, the cost incurred by visitors equals the social cost of the resources they have
to use to visit the site. Thus we would not have to consider side-eﬀects for our partial
equlibrium analysis. In other words, we do neglect possible spill-over eﬀects in the form
of income to local businesses from people visiting the site.23 Under this assumption, we
regard v(q,x) as average valuation net of the cost of visiting the site.




nx[v(x,q) − c(nx,q)] − m(q) (1)
21This assumption implicitly deﬁnes a capacity threshold that divides the range where the consumption
of quality is nonrivalrous from the range where an additional visitor leads to congestion. Thus, quality
is like a club good that can be consumed by an additional user without additional cost as long as
the congestion threshold is not reached.
22If, for example, the site can be visited only with guided tours, the cost for serving one visitor is higher
than in the case where visitors can just wander around.
23Of course, this assumption may seem critical because the positive external eﬀects that the use of
cultural heritage may have on the local economy are a main argument in favour of public support.
These eﬀects, however, presuppose imperfections such as, for example, an imperfect mobility of
factors of production, such that the export of services (which is, in essence, what happens if visitors
from outside the region use the facilities of the local economy) increases the welfare of the local
economy. However, this export of services does not necessarily depend on the fact that there is
some cultural heritage around, unless the possibility to visit historic sites is a crucial element in
the demand for touristic services. Additionally, these spillovers can often be found to be naively
exaggerated. One has to keep in mind that, for example, business for local hotels can be counted as
a beneﬁt from the availability of a historic site if and only if the income that is earned in this sector
could not have been earned in other sectors or other regions of the economy (see also page 7 above).
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The ﬁrst order condition is given by
n[v(x,q) − c(nx,q)] + nx[vx − ncX]
! = 0 (2)
and
nx[vq − cq] − mq
! = 0 (3)
For a straightforward interpretation of equation 2 we rearrange terms to get
v(x,q) + xvx = c(nx,q) + nxcX (4)
This condition simply requires that at the optimum number of (individual) visits, the
marginal value to each visitor must equal the marginal cost of serving an additional
visitor.24
Equation 3 requires that at the optimum level of quality, the cost of a marginal variation
of quality must be equal to the change in individual valuation net of the change in the cost
of serving a visitor, summed up over all (i.e. the optimal number of) visits. Note that a
quality above the minimum level q = 0 should be provided only if the increase in average
valuation is not less than the increase in average cost of serving a customer, resulting
from a marginal increase of quality. More speciﬁcally, at q = 0, vq > mq+cq must hold.25
This condition mirrors the public good character of the quality of a historic site that is
consumed in a nonrivalrous way and in equal amounts by all visitors. While the number
of visits can, in principle, diﬀer among individuals (though homogeneous individuals
will each make an identical number of visits), the amount of quality consumed by each
visitor must necessarily be the same. Therefore, the aggregate willingness to pay for a
marginal increase in quality should equal the marginal cost of quality.
The ﬁrst order condition implicitly determines optimum values x? and q?. It is optimal
to convert and provide the site in the ﬁrst place, however, only if the beneﬁts that can
be derived from the consumption of this piece of cultural heritage outweigh the costs of
providing the service. Normalising the value of the site in the next best alternative to
zero, the necessary condition for the development of the site is given by
24The marginal value to an individual visitor ∂[xv(x,q)]/∂x is determined by two eﬀects: the average
value of a visit (v(x,q)) and the change in average value over all visits (xvx). Marginal cost is
determined analogously.
25An interior solution additionally requires nx[vqq − cqq] < mqq. Given cqq ≥ 0, a suﬃcient condition
for an interior solution is that vqq < 0, i.e. that the increase in quality leads to an increase in the
average valuation of one visit, but that this increase is diminishing with an increas in quality.







?) ≥ 0 (5)
If condition 5 does not hold, the provision of the site is socially undesirable.26
3.2 Proﬁt-maximising supply of cultural heritage
Now let us consider a situation where a proﬁt-maximising supplier provides the service of
“visits to the historic site”. This provider “sells” visits to the consumers, i.e. he charges
an admission fee for visiting the site. The admission fee, of course, aﬀects the number
of visits. The provider, being the sole supplier of this speciﬁc site, takes into account
the eﬀects of a change in the number of visits he sells on the price he can charge for
admission.27
An individual visitor will make visits up to the point where his valuation of this additional
visit equals the admission price. Thus, the number of visits at price p is implicitly deﬁned
by
p ≡ v(x,q) + xvx, (6)
i.e. by the equality of price (representing the marginal cost of a visit) and marginal
valuation of the visit (representing the marginal willingness to pay). In other words,
v(x,q) + xvx denotes an inverse demand function for visits to the site.
The maximisation problem for the provider, thus, is given by
max
q,x
nx[v(x,q) + xvx − c(nx,q)] − m(q) (7)
and the ﬁrst order condition by
26 If, in addition, we want to model other beneﬁts from the availability of the site (e.g. the beneﬁts
that can be attributed to “option demand”) this condition must be modiﬁed to
nx? [v(x?,q?) − c(nx?,q?)] − m(q?) ≥ −B
with B denoting the additional beneﬁts that are independent from the valuation of visitors. If there
are external beneﬁts that depend on the level of use, this aﬀects the optimum number of visits and,
thereby, possibly the optimum quality.
27Because the historic site can be seen as unique in the way that the same “experience” to the visitor
cannot be provided by any other site, the provider of the service is able to behave like a monopolistic
supplier. Of course, diﬀerent historic sites (or, more generally, diﬀerent parts of the cultural heritage)
may be regarded as close substitutes, such that the situation could be aptly described as one of
monopolistic competition, although in some cases the cost of substitution may be large (e.g. if
consumers have to incur travel costs).
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n[v(x,q) + xvx − c(nx,q)] + nx[2vx + xvxx − ncX]
! = 0 (8)
and
nx[vq + xvxq − cq] − mq
! = 0 (9)
Rearranging terms, we get from equation 8
v(x,q) + 3xvx + x
2vxx = c(nx,q) + nxcX (10)
A comparison of equations 10 and 4 shows that, with decreasing average valuation, the
proﬁt maximising number of visits is below the welfare maximising number of visits. For
any given q and at a given level of x, the impact of a change of x on costs is the same in
both cases. With vx , 0, marginal revenues are always lower than marginal willingness to
pay. The value of x for which marginal revenues equals marginal cost, therefore, must be
lower than the value at which marginal willingness to pay equals marginal cost. Thus,
proﬁt-maximising providers tend to sell less than the optimal number of visits.
Given that the value of x that maximises equation 7 at a given q is smaller than x?, a
comparison of equations 9 and 3 shows that proﬁt maximising providers of visits have an
incentive to reduce quality unless an increase in quality results in a suﬃcient decrease of
the price elasticity of demand. If vxq is positive and suﬃciently large, i.e. if by providing
a high quality, the suppliers can make demand for visits suﬃciently less price elastic,
then there may be an incentive to provide a higher than optimal quality.
This becomes obvious in the case where it is welfare-maximising to provide the lowest
possible quality q? = 0 resulting from vq < cq. In this case, a suﬃciently high and positive
vxq can create an incentive to set q > 0, i.e. a suboptimally high quality.
Let us denote the proﬁt-maximising choices of x and q as ¯ x and ¯ q respectively.
Given a suboptimal number of visits and a suboptimal quality, the sum of consumer and
producer surplus is less than with x? and q?. There may exist sites for which the overall
condition of equation 5 holds, but for which
n¯ x[v(¯ x, ¯ q) − c(n¯ x, ¯ q)] − m(¯ q) < 0, (11)
i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus, given proﬁt maximising provision of
visits to the historic site, is less than the cost of providing the site at all. From a welfare-
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maximising point of view, even if provision of these sites combined with optimal use
would be desirable, these sites should not be provided by a proﬁt-maximising supplier.
If the decision to provide the site is made by this proﬁt-maximising supplier, he will
look not at the sum of producer and consumer surplus, but on the proﬁts he can expect
from running the site. Because proﬁt is necessarily below the aggregate welfare, a proﬁt
maximising producer may decide not to convert the site despite the fact that it would be
worthwhile to do so, even given a suboptimal number of visits and a suboptimal quality.
To sum up the results of this subsection: if a proﬁt maximising provider decides whether
to develop a historic site for the purpose of selling visits to “consumers”, and on the
quality and the admission fee, then
• the proﬁt maximising admission fee will reduce the number of visits below the
socially optimal level
• the quality provided will be too low unless a high quality makes the demand for
visits suﬃciently less price elastic, in which case the quality provided may be too
high; and
• the (potential) producer may decide against the provision of the service, even if it
were socially optimal to develop the site for visitors.
3.3 Supply under a zero-proﬁt restriction
One may suspect that the suboptimality of private provision of the site results from the
proﬁts earned by the providers, and that regulation by imposing a zero-proﬁt restriction
may generate a welfare maximising provision.
Imposition of a zero-proﬁt condition entails several problems: Iif the provider of the site
operates under a zero-proﬁt condition, then a unique combination of quality of the site
and number of visits that is chosen under the restriction that zero-proﬁts are earned
does not necessarily exist. In this case, the preferences of the person who decides about
16Optimising the Use of Cultural Heritage
the admission policy of the site will become important.28
Thus, any restriction on the allowed proﬁts must be accompanied by an objective set
for the managers of the site by the regulatory body. To be enforcable, this objective
must be cast in terms of variables that are observable by the regulator. Thus, it is
highly impractical to require the management of the site to pursue the aim of welfare
maximisation subject to the restriction that earned income must cover the costs of
providing the service.
In any case, if we preclude price discrimination, the condition that costs must be covered
by earned income simply means that admission fees equal average total cost, i.e. each
visitor is charged




Given the fact that the willingness to pay for the marginal visit must equal the admission
fee, this translates into




The restriction of equation 13 implicitly deﬁnes a functional relationship between x and
q29 that serves as the restriction for any objective function the management of the site
may have.
Suppose, for example, that the management wants to maximise the number of visits.
We thus need to maximise x(q) by choosing q. It becomes obvious that quality in this
case is only instrumental to the end of attracting as many visitors as possible. We can
28For example, one could imagine that the decision maker prefers quality over quantity. This preference
can have several reasons. For example, the director of a museum or a historic site is interested
in good standing among his peers. Therefore he designs his services for other experts rather than
for the “consumers” of cultural sites. In this case, the choice can be expected to be the maximum
quality that can be sustained when costs must be covered by earned income. On the other hand,
the decision-maker could be interested in maximising the number of visits. The result then will
be biased towards the number of visits. Further, quality would only count to the extent to which
it increases the visitors’ valuation more than it increases the cost of maintaining the service. Of
course, preferences of managers may be important also in the case of proﬁt maximising supply if
managers are free to pursue non proﬁt-maximising objectives. However, market forces may require
managers to maximise proﬁts regardless of their individual preferences so that the assumption of
proﬁt maximising behaviour can be regarded as a justiﬁed simpliﬁcation.
29The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an implicit function x(q) that satisﬁes
F(x(q),q) = 0 in the neighbourhood of a point (x0,q0) are that the partial derivatives Fx and Fq
are continuous and that Fx at x0 is unequal to zero (see Chiang (1984, p. 204 ﬀ)).
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determine the derivative dx/dq according to dx/dq = −Fq/Fx and set this derivative
equal to zero (which means Fq
! = 0). The ﬁrst order condition then is given by30
nx[vq + xvxq − cq] − mq
! = 0 (14)
which diﬀers from the condition of equation 9 with regard to the value of x.31
Analogously, if the objective is to maximise quality, the solution to maxx q(x) is found
by solving
2vx + xvxx − ncX +
m(q)
nx2
! = 0 (15)
Neither of these conditions matches the conditions for the welfare-maximising provision
of visits. Either optimal quality or optimal quantity can result by chance, but x? and q?
will never be reached simultaneously.
3.4 Supply with a ﬁxed-cost subsidy
The main problem with regard to the welfare-maximising provision of visits to the site
seems to result from the fact that, with marginal cost pricing, the earned income does not
fully cover the cost of providing the site at a quality q. This can most easily be seen in the
case where the marginal cost of providing visits is constant and, therefore, equal to the
average cost (cX = 0, i.e. the change in average cost, equals zero). In this case, all visitors
with a willingness to pay not less than the average cost of serving a visitor (denoted by
¯ c(q)) should be admitted. If tickets are priced at ¯ c(q), however, the earned income will
not suﬃce to cover m(q). In other words, the provider of the site will not beneﬁt from
the diﬀerence between the average valuation per visit and the admission fee per visit.
This diﬀerence will count, however, in the welfare judgment as a counterbalance to the
resources spent for making the site available at a quality q. Furthermore, to the extent
that this diﬀerence increases with an increasing quality, quality should be raised up to
the point where the marginal increase in this diﬀerence (summed up over all visitors)
equals the marginal cost of increasing quality (cf. the optimality condition in equation
3). Again, if the provider does not beneﬁt from this increasing valuation, he lacks the





vq + xvxq − cq − mq/(nx)
2vx + xvxx − ncX + m(q)/(nx2)
.
31The diﬀerent values of x result from the fact that in this case x is determined by x(q), while in the
case of the proﬁt maximising provider x and q were determined simultaneously by solving equations
8 and 9.
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Therefore, one could be tempted to expect optimal provision of visits to a historic site
if the provider is told to care only for the number of visits while getting a subsidy for
his investment into quality. This is to say that only the cost of serving visitors but not
m(q) needs to be covered by earned income. m(q) will be subsidised, for example, out of
lump-sum taxes collected from all potential visitors to the site. It is easy to see, however,
that this regulation does not guarantee a welfare maximising use of cultural heritage.
The restriction under which the management tries to maximise x simply reduces to
˜ F(x,q) ≡ v(x,q) + xvx − c(nx,q) = 0, (16)
and the respective ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution is given by
[vq + xvxq − cq]
! = 0 (17)
Consider again a situation where vq < cq and where the lowest possible quality should be
provided. Again, if vxq is suﬃciently high, then in this case, q > 0 will be choosen, which
is clearly suboptimal. Furthermore, if vq − cq < mq at q = 0, then q = 0 is the welfare
maximising solution, although a provider under this kind of regulation has an incentive
to provide q > 0. Not surprisingly, promising a subsidy for investment in quality creates
a bias in favour of a suboptimally high quality.
As a result, we can state that no combination of restrictions on proﬁts, even if combined
with a subsidy for costs not covered by earned income, will necessarily guarantee the
ﬁrst best outcome. In the case of constant marginal cost of serving visitors, for example,
an optimal solution would require a regulator to
• specify the quality to be provided
• require the cost of serving visitors to be covered by earned income
• promise to subsidise the deﬁcit that results from provision in accordance with the
ﬁrst two requirements.
If the marginal cost of serving visitors is increasing, the requirement of visiting costs
being covered by earned income must be replaced by the requirement to price admissions
according to marginal cost. To specify the ticket price, the regulator would have to know
the exact demand function for visits to the site.
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4. Optimising the Use of Cultural Heritage: Some
Conclusions
The preceding subsections have shown in which way diﬀerent institutional arrangements
governing the provision of the good “cultural heritage” (or more speciﬁcally the service
that is oﬀered to users) aﬀect the use of cultural heritage and thereby the aggregate
welfare that is created by this use. The most important lesson to learn is that, un-
less a public policy maker has nearly perfect knowledge of cost structures and demand
functions (i.e. of the valuation potential users put onto the stock of cultural heritage),
a welfare maximising, ﬁrst-best solution is unlikely to be reached. Except for this rare
case, regulated provision necessarily yields second best outcomes. Consequently, diﬀerent
regulatory schemes may be compared according to the welfare loss they imply.
There may be a case for granting the monopoly right to provide the services to a private
supplier with or without regulation. There may as well be a case for free access (i.e. a
zero entry price) with all costs being subsidised out of tax payments (either from taxes
collected from all individuals, or taxes collected from local businesses).
All these schemes aﬀect the actual use of a cultural heritage good as well as the quality
of the services provided. The extent to which a stock of cultural heritage is used is the
main determinant for the realisation of direct beneﬁts, which may depend on the quality.
Since the ﬂow of beneﬁts to the users that results from quality accrues to them in a non-
rivalrous way, quality has certain features characteristic of a public good. Therefore, if
price discrimination is impossible and the cost of providing a speciﬁc quality has to be
borne by all users to the same extent in the form of a premium on the admission fee for
every visit, there exists a welfare loss from suboptimal use.
If, in an extension of the model, individuals are heterogeneous, this beneﬁts those users
whose consumer surplus is higher than the premium they have to pay. However, this same
eﬀect harms (potential) users who are excluded despite the fact that their willingness to
pay exceeds the marginal cost of admission. Thus, higher quality redistributes beneﬁts
to those who would be willing to pay more than the admission fee for visiting the site.
The importance of actual use may increase if repercussion eﬀects of use on valuation are
taken into account, i.e. if the eﬀect of actual use on future valuation and, thus, future
demand is incorporated. In this case, a lower number of users does not only mean that
less people beneﬁt from the use of cultural heritage, but also that a potential increase
in the valuation put onto this stock will not be realised.
The importance of the level of use increases also if there are consumption externalities,
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i.e. if non-users beneﬁt from the number of visits. In this case, there should be a subsidy
to admission fees, i.e. visitors should pay less than the marginal cost.32
The analysis presented above could be extended by looking at alternative pricing schemes.
Because quality can be used in a non-rivalrous way, two part tariﬀs may yield better
results than pricing of the individual admissions. (Potential) users could, for example,
be oﬀered a ticket that allows for as many visits as desired within a given time period.
This reduces the marginal cost of an additional visit to zero for each holder of the ticket
(or more precisely, to the opportunity cost of visiting the site in terms of the foregone
utility from pursuing other activities). Even in this scenario, however, all (potential)
users, whose aggregate beneﬁt from all uses they will make is less than the price of
the ticket, will be excluded, even if they could be served at an additional cost that is
less than their willingness to pay. This problem arises only in the case of heterogeneous
individuals, but then again the possibility of price discrimination is of importance.33
Beside the direct beneﬁts realised by actual users and the external beneﬁts that depend
on the level of use, there may be an additional case for public funding due to the potential
externalities from the existence of cultural heritage. If such externalities do exist, then
non-users should contribute to the provision, and a site should be converted even if the
welfare generated from direct use is not suﬃciently high (see footnote 26).
Whichever institutional arrangement (of all those arrangements that are second best,
given the additional restrictions imposed on quality, costs and proﬁts) is optimal depends
on the sensitivity of (potential) users to admission costs and on the cost of providing
access to the cultural heritage and serving individual users. Without a good knowledge
and understanding of the costs and beneﬁts of the use of cultural heritage, optimising
the use of cultural heritage by selecting the mechanism or the institutional arrangement
32This can easily be shown in a simple extension of the basic maximisation problem 1: Assume that
there are external beneﬁts that depend on the number of visits nx, denoted by e(nx) with e0 > 0.
In this case, the respective ﬁrst order condition is given by
n[v(x,q) + e0 − c(nx,q)] + nx[vx − ncX]
! = 0
and equation 3. Rearranging terms yields
v(x,q) + e0 + xvx = c(nx,q) + nxcX
This condition results in an optimal x > x?, which requires lower admission fees.
The other scenarios can be modiﬁed accordingly.
33In the case of homogeneous individuals, a ﬁrst best solution would be possible if the ﬂat fee is set
equal to m(q)/n, and tickets are priced at marginal cost. To achieve the optimal quality and the
optimal number of visits, however, one has to know the exact shape of the function v(x,q).
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that entails the smallest diﬀerence to the welfare maximum, must remain futile and
meaningless.
On the other side of the same coin, however, we ﬁnd the importance of understanding
the welfare eﬀects resulting from institutional arrangements for the design of studies that
are intended to elicit the value of a speciﬁc preservation project. Particulary in cases
where public funding is involved in order to correct the distortions that may result from
proﬁt-maximising private provision or to account for various externalities, it is important
to anticipate the likely level of use (as well as the likely quality that will be provided). In
this sense, the institutional arrangement that will govern the use of an asset that could
be preserved and become part of the cultural heritage is an important factor of which
the preservation decision must take account.
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